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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
After the Government of the Virgin Islands denied 
Tamarind Resort Associates ("TRA") a Coastal Zone 
Management Act ("CZMA") permit in order to develop Hans 
Lollik Island, TRA brought suit against the Government in 
the District Court of the Virgin Islands alleging breach of 
contract, temporary and permanent unconstitutional 
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takings, and violation of TRA's constitutional rights to due 
process and equal protection. The district court granted 
summary judgment for the Government on the breach of 
contract claim and, treating the constitutional claims as an 
administrative writ of review, affirmed the Board of Land 
Use Appeals' decision denying TRA a coastal zone permit. 
 
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether 
summary judgment was appropriate on TRA's breach of 
contract claim. In addition, we must examine the extent to 
which the District Court of the Virgin Islands has 
jurisdiction to decide writs of review and determine if the 
district court erred in reviewing TRA's constitutional claims 
in its appellate capacity. 
 
Because we agree with the district court that the 
agreement is unambiguous and that the Government did 
not breach the agreement by applying the CZMA to TRA, we 
will affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment 
on the breach of contract claim. With respect to the 
remaining constitutional claims, however, we find that the 
district court erred in treating those claims as a writ of 
review and therefore will remand for the district court to 
consider TRA's constitutional claims under its original, 
federal question jurisdiction. 
 
I. 
 
Great Hans Lollik Island is a 500 acre uninhabited island 
located approximately two miles off the coast of St. Thomas. 
In 1964, when the Island was owned by Hans Lollik 
Corporation, the Corporation and the Government of the 
Virgin Islands entered into an agreement which was 
enacted into law as Act No. 1145, 1964 V.I. Sess. Laws 
120, and amended by Act No. 1327, 1965 V.I. Sess. Laws 
47, and Act No. 1883, 1967 V.I. Sess. Laws 53. The 
agreement contains a provision identifying it as 
"contractual and proprietary in nature."1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The district court applied principles of contract interpretation rather 
than canons of statutory construction in interpreting the agreement 
pursuant to our rationale in West Indian Co., Ltd. v. Government of the 
Virgin Islands, 844 F.2d 1007, 1016-17 (3d Cir. 1988). The parties have 
not disputed this ruling on appeal. For the reasons articulated by the 
district court, we also will interpret the agreement under basic contract 
principles. 
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Under the agreement, the Government approved "the use 
of Hans Lollik Island for the purposes of a Hotel, Marina 
and Housing Project" and provided for the lease of certain 
Government land to construct a marina and related 
facilities. The agreement states that the initial development 
objective is to construct a hotel "with accommodations for 
no less than fifty (50) rooms . . . together with a further 
development plan calling for the construction of 
approximately one hundred and fifty (150) major 
residences." The agreement also contains language that 
mirrors the Contract Clause of Article I, S10, cl. 1 of the 
United States Constitution which states that "the 
Government will not adopt any legislation impairing or 
limiting the obligations of this contract." 
 
In October of 1978, the Government enacted the Virgin 
Islands Coastal Zone Management Act, V.I. Code Ann. tit. 
12, SS 901-914 (1982 & Supp. 1997) in order to harmonize 
the goals of environmental protection and economic 
development. V.I. Code Ann. tit. 12, S 903(b)(1)-(11); see 
also Virgin Islands Conservation Soc'y, Inc. v. Virgin Islands 
Bd. of Land Use Appeals, 881 F.2d 28, 29 (3d Cir. 1989). 
The general purpose of the CZMA was to set up a 
comprehensive program for the management, conservation, 
and orderly development of the coastal area. West Indian 
Co., Ltd. v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 844 F.2d 
1007, 1011 (3d Cir. 1988); see also V.I. Code Ann. tit. 12, 
S 903(b)(4). Under the CZMA, development of the coastal 
zone may only be accomplished by obtaining a permit from 
the Coastal Zone Management Commission ("CZMC"). V.I. 
Code Ann. tit. 12, SS 904 and 910. The CZMA also provides, 
however, that "[n]othing herein contained shall be 
construed to abridge or alter vested rights obtained in a 
development in the first tier coastal zone prior to the 
effective date of [this Act]." V.I. Code Ann. tit. 12, S 905(f). 
Hans Lollik Island is located in the first tier coastal zone 
and is subject to CZMA restrictions absent a vested right in 
development obtained prior to February 1, 1979, the 
effective date of the CZMA. 
 
TRA is a joint venture established in the Virgin Islands 
comprised of Tamarind Resort Corporation, a Delaware 
corporation, and Culligan Porsche, Inc., a New York 
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corporation. In 1990, TRA purchased Hans Lollik Island. 
TRA is the successor-in-interest to the 1964 agreement 
between the Government and Hans Lollik Corporation. 
 
TRA developed a plan to construct an 800-unit resort on 
the island including a 150 unit hotel. TRA submitted an 
application to the CZMC for a permit. The CZMC rejected 
TRA's application. TRA thereafter submitted a plan for a 
675-unit development, including a 150 unit hotel and 525 
residences consisting of 160 major residences and 365 
villas or condominium-style homes. 
 
The CZMC held public hearings on TRA's revised plan at 
which many speakers voiced opposition to the development. 
The CZMC ultimately denied TRA a permit for construction 
of the 675-unit proposal in a detailed decision setting forth 
its extensive findings and conclusions. 
 
TRA appealed the CZMC decision to the Board of Land 
Use Appeals. The Board affirmed the CZMC's decision 
rejecting TRA's permit application. TRA then brought this 
action against the Government in the District Court of the 
Virgin Islands asserting claims for breach of contract, 
temporary and permanent unconstitutional takings, and 
violation of TRA's constitutional rights to due process and 
equal protection. TRA moved for summary judgment on the 
breach of contract and the due process and equal 
protection claims and the Government cross moved for 
summary judgment on all claims. The district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the Government on TRA's 
breach of contract claim and, treating TRA's remaining 
constitutional claims as an administrative writ of review, 
affirmed the Board of Land Use Appeals' decision denying 
TRA's permit application. This timely appeal followed. 
 
II. 
 
We review the district court's order granting summary 
judgment on TRA's breach of contract claim de novo. Ideal 
Dairy Farms, Inc. v. John Labatt, Ltd., 90 F.3d 737, 743 (3d 
Cir. 1996). 
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A. 
 
Under the law of the Virgin Islands, interpretation of an 
integrated agreement is to be determined as a question of 
law by the court if it does not depend on the credibility of 
extrinsic evidence or a choice of reasonable inferences to be 
drawn from extrinsic evidence.2 Restatement (Second) of 
Contract S 212(2) (1981). Any determination as to meaning 
should be made in light of the relevant evidence, but after 
the transaction has been examined in its entirety, the 
words of an integrated agreement are the most important 
evidence of intention. Id. at S 212, cmt. b. It is axiomatic 
that where the language of a contract is clear and 
unambiguous, it must be given its plain meaning. Id. at 
S 202(3)(a). 
 
In addition, "[i]t is a fundamental principle of contract 
law that `disputes involving the interpretation of 
unambiguous contracts are resolvable as a matter of law, 
and are, therefore, appropriate cases for summary 
judgment.' " Hadley v. Gerrie, 124 B.R. 679, 683 (D.V.I.), 
aff 'd, Gas House, Inc. v. Unicorp American Corp., 952 F.2d 
1392 (3d Cir. 1991)(table decision)(citing Reed, Wible and 
Brown v. Mahogany Run Dev. Corp., 550 F. Supp. 1095, 
1099 (D.V.I. 1982)). We have consistently embraced the 
basic common law principle that a contract is 
unambiguous if it is reasonably capable of only one 
construction. See, e.g., Sumitomo Mach. Corp. of America, 
Inc. v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 81 F.3d 328, 332 (3d Cir. 1996); 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The agreement does not provide what law governs its interpretation, 
but because the agreement relates to property within the Virgin Islands, 
was performed in the Virgin Islands, and was entered into by the 
Government of the Virgin Islands, we will apply Virgin Islands law. The 
Virgin Islands Code establishes the sources of law for the Islands as 
follows: 
 
       The rules of the common law, as expressed in the restatements of 
       the law approved by the American Law Institute, and to the extent 
       not so expressed, as generally understood and applied in the United 
       States, shall be the rules of decision in the courts of the Virgin 
       Islands in cases to which they apply, in the absence of local laws 
to 
       the contrary. 
 
V.I. Code Ann. tit. 1, S 4 (1967). 
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American Flint Glass Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. Beaumont 
Glass Co., 62 F.3d 574, 581 (3d Cir. 1995). We therefore 
will affirm a grant of summary judgment in a breach of 
contract action only where the contract is unambiguous 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. 
 
B. 
 
TRA bases its breach of contract claim on the assertion 
that the Government breached the agreement by requiring 
TRA to obtain a CZMA permit prior to developing Hans 
Lollik Island. TRA contends that in applying the CZMA to 
TRA, the Government impaired TRA's rights under the 
agreement in breach of its covenant to refrain from 
adopting any legislation impairing or limiting the 
obligations of the agreement. In order to determine whether 
application of the CZMA impairs TRA's contractual rights 
for purposes of summary judgment, we must first 
determine what rights the agreement grants TRA and/or 
whether the agreement is ambiguous as to the contractual 
rights to which TRA is entitled. 
 
The agreement contemplates an initial development on 
Hans Lollik Island of a hotel with a minimum offifty rooms 
and approximately one hundred and fifty major residences. 
In addition, the agreement provides that: 
 
       In regard to questions of land use and the zoning laws, 
       the Government has satisfied itself and does hereby 
       determine that the use of the respective sites in 
       question for purposes of a Hotel, Marina and Housing 
       Project are approved. The Government will further, 
       consistent with the public interest, issue such 
       certificates, licenses and permits and take such other 
       action as may be required of it under any safety, health 
       and related laws, and any rulings and regulations in 
       connection therewith. 
 
The Government contends that the agreement granted TRA 
the right to use the Island for purposes of a Hotel, Marina, 
and Housing Project, but that the agreement did not grant 
TRA unlimited discretion to develop the Island for that use. 
By contrast, TRA contends that the Government granted it 
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a vested right to develop Hans Lollik Island on any scale 
above the specified minimum levels contemplated by the 
agreement. We find TRA's interpretation of the agreement to 
be unreasonable. 
 
Prior to the agreement, Hans Lollik Island was zoned as 
R-10 under the Virgin Islands Zoning and Subdivision Act 
which permitted one or two family residential use only. 
Under the plain language of the agreement, the 
Government granted TRA an exception to the R-10 zoning 
classification by approving the use of the Island for 
purposes of a Hotel, Marina, and Housing Project. In light 
of the entire transaction between the parties, the only 
reasonable interpretation of the agreement is that it granted 
TRA the right to use the property for commercial purposes 
but did not grant TRA unlimited discretion to develop the 
property for that use. 
 
This interpretation is further supported by the fact that 
the Government only agreed to issue necessary permits for 
development if the proposed development was consistent 
with the public interest. Under TRA's interpretation of the 
agreement, the Government would have no discretion to 
deny TRA the appropriate permits for development. Were we 
to accept TRA's interpretation, the phrase `consistent with 
the public interest' would be rendered nugatory, which is 
an interpretation to be avoided. See Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts S 203(a)(1981)(stating that "an interpretation 
which gives . . . effective meaning to all the terms is 
preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part .. . of no 
effect"). 
 
In addition, the plausibility of TRA's interpretation is 
further undermined by the agreement's silence on 
discretional development limits. For example, while the 
agreement contemplates the development of a hotel with a 
minimum of fifty rooms and approximately one hundred 
and fifty major residences, the agreement does not set a 
maximum size limit. The agreement, however, does contain 
an integration clause which specifies that the agreement 
"constitutes the entire agreement of the parties." It is 
therefore evident from the agreement that the parties had 
no understanding as to a maximum level of development. 
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The agreement's silence on a maximum development 
level, however, does not indicate, as TRA contends, that 
TRA was granted unlimited discretion to develop the Island. 
Both parties have relied on United States v. Winstar Corp., 
116 S. Ct. 2432 (1996), to support their respective positions 
on this point. Winstar construed the unmistakability 
doctrine, a canon of contract construction which provides 
that "a contract with a sovereign government will not be 
read to include an unstated term exempting the other 
contracting party from the application of a subsequent 
sovereign act." Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2456. It is somewhat 
unclear after the Winstar plurality opinion as to the type of 
contract to which the unmistakability doctrine applies. See 
Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. United States, 112 F.3d 1569, 
1578-79 (Fed. Cir. 1997)(noting that plurality found the 
doctrine inapplicable to risk of loss shifting contracts but 
that remaining five justices agreed that the doctrine's 
application is unrelated to the nature of the underlying 
contract). It is clear, however, that one of the basic 
principles underlying the doctrine is the concern that it 
would be unreasonable to presume, in the absence of an 
express contractual provision, that a sovereign intended a 
contractual waiver of a basic sovereign power. See generally 
Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2477 (Scalia, J., concurring)(stating 
that "[w]hen the contracting party is the government . . . it 
is simply not reasonable to presume . . . that the sovereign 
[promises] that none of its multifarious sovereign acts, 
needful for the public good, will incidentally disable it or 
the other party from performing one of the promised acts."); 
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148 
(1982)("[t]o presume that a sovereign forever waives the 
right to exercise one of its sovereign powers unless it 
expressly reserves the right to exercise that power in a 
commercial agreement turns the concept of sovereignty on 
its head, and we do not adopt this analysis."). 
 
Based on this basic principle and under the specific facts 
of this case, we find TRA's position that the Government 
granted TRA unlimited discretion to develop the Island, 
thereby relinquishing its power to regulate that 
development, to be unreasonable in light of the fact that the 
agreement does not contain any language to that effect. 
Accordingly, because the agreement does not speak to a 
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maximum limitation on development and does not explicitly 
or implicitly grant TRA the right of unlimited development, 
the Government was at liberty to restrict TRA's 
development by applying the CZMA to TRA.3  
 
Our decision in West Indian Co., Ltd. (WICO) v. 
Government of the Virgin Islands, 844 F.2d 1007 (3d Cir. 
1988) is instructive on this point. In WICO, we examined 
the relationship between contractual obligations and 
general police powers. WICO brought suit against the 
Government of the Virgin Islands for a violation of the 
contract clause of the United States Constitution after the 
Government enacted a Repeal Act which purported to 
repeal a Second Addendum to a settlement agreement 
between the Government and WICO that exempted WICO 
from the CZMA. WICO, 844 F.2d 1013-14. 
 
We noted that the threshold inquiry in such a case is 
whether the state law has operated as a substantial 
impairment of a contractual relationship. Id. at 1021. We 
held that the Repeal Act substantially impaired WICO's 
contractual rights under the Second Addendum by 
attempting to withdraw WICO's right to be free for a limited 
time from CZMA restrictions. In completing our analysis, 
we held that the Repeal Act was invalid because there was 
no legitimate public purpose for the regulation's substantial 
impairment.4 Significantly, we noted that: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. TRA also argues that the CZMA, by its own terms, does not apply to 
development of the Island because the agreement granted TRA a vested 
right to develop prior to the effective date of the CZMA. As properly 
noted 
by the district court, the Board's interpretation of the CZMA does not 
relate to TRA's breach of contract claim but is more appropriately 
analyzed in connection with a potential writ of review. Accordingly, we 
will discuss this portion of TRA's argument in Part III in connection with 
TRA's constitutional claims. 
 
4. We applied the following three-step analysis from the Supreme Court's 
decision in Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 
459 U.S. 400, 411-12 (1983): (1) whether the state law substantially 
impairs the contractual relationship; and if so (2) whether the state has 
a significant and legitimate public purpose for the regulation; and if so 
(3) whether the adjustment of rights and responsibilities of the 
contracting parties is based on reasonable conditions and is of a 
character appropriate to the public purpose justifying adoption of the 
regulation. WICO, 844 F.2d at 1021. We held that the Repeal Act was 
invalid because there was a substantial impairment in WICO's 
contractual relationship and because the Repeal Act could not be 
justified by a significant public purpose. Id. at 1021-22. 
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       We hold only that the Repeal Act is invalid. We do not, 
       of course, hold that the police power of the Virgin 
       Islands with respect to WICO's [land] was exhausted 
       when the Second Addendum was approved. WICO is 
       obviously not immune from generally applicable police 
       power measures not inconsistent with the Second 
       Addendum. Moreover, if conditions materially change 
       so as to create a substantial problem that could not be 
       foreseen in 1982, it may be that generally applicable 
       land use regulations could validly alter the manner in 
       which WICO may utilize its property. 
 
Id. at 1022-23. 
 
In accordance with WICO, TRA is not immune from 
Government regulations that are not inconsistent with 
TRA's contractual rights under the agreement. Because we 
hold that the agreement is unambiguous and grants TRA 
the right to use the Island for commercial purposes but 
does not grant TRA unlimited discretion to develop the 
Island for that use, the Government's application of the 
CZMA to TRA does not impair any of TRA's contractual 
rights. Accordingly, summary judgment was appropriately 
granted in favor of the Government on TRA's breach of 
contract claim. 
 
III. 
 
With respect to TRA's constitutional claims, we exercise 
plenary review over the district court's decision to examine 
these claims in an appellate capacity. See Union Pacific R.R. 
Co. v. Ametek, Inc., 104 F.3d 558, 561 (3d Cir. 
1997)(stating that "[t]his court exercises plenary review over 
matters of jurisdiction."). In order to evaluate the propriety 
of the district court's decision, we must first examine the 
boundaries of the jurisdiction currently conferred upon the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands. 
 
A. 
 
Our analysis of the jurisdictional boundaries of the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands must begin with Article 
IV, Section 3 of the United States Constitution, which 
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grants Congress the power to designate the jurisdiction of 
the district court and the territorial court. Brow v. Farrelly, 
994 F.2d 1027, 1032 (3d Cir. 1993). Congress first 
exercised this power in 1936 by enacting the Revised 
Organic Act, 48 U.S.C. SS 1541-1645 (1994). Id. The 1936 
Revised Organic Act was subsequently replaced by the more 
comprehensive Revised Organic Act of 1954. The Revised 
Organic Act acts as the constitution of the Virgin Islands 
and as such defines the jurisdictional boundaries of the 
Virgin Islands courts. Id. 
 
Section 1612 of the 1954 Revised Organic Act confers 
upon the District Court of the Virgin Islands federal 
question jurisdiction as well as original jurisdiction over 
questions of local law subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of 
local courts over civil actions where the amount in 
controversy is less than $500. Revised Organic Act of July 
22, 1954, ch. 558, SS 22-23, 68 Stat. 506 (1955) (amended 
1978, 1984); Brow, 994 F.2d at 1032. In addition, section 
1613 of the 1954 Revised Organic Act provides that local 
courts shall share concurrent jurisdiction over all actions 
conferred upon them by local law. Revised Organic Act of 
July 22, 1954, ch. 558, S 23, 68 Stat. 506 (1955) (amended 
1978, 1984); Brow, 994 F.2d at 1032 n.2. 
 
In 1984, Congress amended the Revised Organic Act and 
effectively eliminated the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands' original jurisdiction over local matters. Congress 
amended section 1612(b) by granting the district court only 
original jurisdiction over federal questions, diversity actions 
and any local matters "the jurisdiction over which is not 
then vested by local law in the local courts of the Virgin 
Islands." 48 U.S.C. S 1612(b)(1994). In addition, Congress 
amended section 1611(b) to permit the Virgin Islands 
legislature to vest jurisdiction in the local courts over all 
matters in which any court established by the United 
States does not have exclusive jurisdiction. Id. at S 1611(b). 
We have interpreted section 1611 as amended as 
empowering the Virgin Islands legislature to completely 
divest the district court of its original jurisdiction over local 
actions. Estate of Thomas Mall, Inc. v. Territorial Court of 
Virgin Islands, 923 F.2d 258, 262-64 (3d Cir. 1991). 
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In 1990, the Virgin Islands legislature exercised this 
power and divested the district court of its jurisdiction over 
all local civil matters effective October 1, 1991. V.I. Code 
Ann. tit. 4, S 76(a) (1997). We have held that this 1990 
enactment not only stripped the district court of its original 
jurisdiction over local matters when a complaint is filed in 
the district court, but also divested the district court of its 
jurisdiction to determine writs of review appealing local 
administrative determinations. Moravian Sch. Advisory Bd. 
of St. Thomas V.I. v. Rawlins, 70 F.3d 270, 273 (3d Cir. 
1995). Specifically, we held that the Virgin Islands 
legislature implicitly repealed the general Virgin Islands 
provision which establishes writs of review as civil actions, 
V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, S1421, to the extent that provision 
confers writ of review jurisdiction upon the district court 
over local matters. Id. 
 
B. 
 
The district court examined TRA's constitutional claims 
in its appellate capacity based on the premise that TRA 
could have brought those claims via a writ of review in the 
district court pursuant to V.I. Code Ann. tit. 12, 
S 913(d)(1982). Section 913(d) is a provision of the CZMA 
which provides that a petition for writ of review may be filed 
in the district court pursuant to the general Virgin Islands 
writ of review provisions by any person aggrieved by the 
denial of an application for a coastal zone permit. V.I. Code 
Ann. tit. 12, S 913(d). Under the rationale of Moravian and 
because the general Virgin Islands writ of review provisions 
have been implicitly repealed as they apply to the district 
court's jurisdiction to decide writs of review over local 
matters, section 913 of the CZMA is similarly invalid as it 
applies to the district court's former writ of review 
jurisdiction. TRA therefore could not have brought a writ of 
review in the district court under section 913(d) of the 
CZMA. Accordingly, the district court erred in reviewing 
TRA's constitutional claims in its appellate capacity. 
 
At oral argument, the Government stated that it was 
unopposed to our remanding TRA's constitutional claims. 
Because the district court should examine TRA's 
constitutional claims under its original jurisdiction in the 
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first instance, we will remand for the district court to 
determine whether there are any genuine issues of material 
fact relating to these claims that would preclude summary 
judgment.5 
 
IV. 
 
We conclude that because the Agreement unambiguously 
grants TRA the use of Hans Lollik Island for commercial 
purposes but does not grant TRA unlimited discretion in 
development, the Government did not breach the 
Agreement by applying CZMA restrictions to TRA. We will 
therefore affirm that portion of the district court's order 
that granted summary judgment on Count I. We alsofind 
that the district court erred in examining Counts II, III, and 
IV under its former writ of review jurisdiction, and therefore 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. As previously noted, TRA has asserted on appeal that the CZMA by its 
own terms does not apply to TRA because the Agreement granted TRA a 
vested right in development prior to the effective date of the CZMA. The 
district court interpreted this claim as a writ of review challenge to the 
CZMC's decision to deny TRA a CZMA permit. While we hold that the 
district court does not have original jurisdiction over writs of review, 
on 
remand the district court should determine whether it would be 
appropriate to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any writ of review 
claims fairly made by TRA. See City of Chicago v. International College of 
Surgeons, ___ S. Ct. ___, ___ 1997 WL 76450, *7 (1997)(holding that 
district court had supplemental jurisdiction over claims challenging 
administrative decision once case was properly removed based on 
original jurisdiction arising from constitutional claims). 
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